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Abstract 
In 1978, Californians approved Proposition 13, which fixed property tax rates at 1% of housing 
prices at the time of purchase.  Beyond its fiscal consequences, Proposition 13 created a lock-in 
effect on housing choice because of the implicit tax break enjoyed by homeowners living in the 
same house for a long time.  In this paper, I provide estimates of this lock-in effect, using a 
natural experiment created by two subsequent amendments to Proposition 13 - Propositions 60 
and 90.  These amendments allow households headed by an individual over the age of 55 to 
transfer the implicit tax benefit to a new home.  I show that mobility rates of 55-year old 
homeowners are approximately 25% higher than those of 54 year olds.  The second contribution 
of this paper is the incorporation of transaction costs, due to Proposition 13, into a household 
location decision model, providing a new way to estimate marginal willingness to pay (MWTP) 
for housing characteristics.  The key insight of this model is that because of the property tax 
laws, different potential buyers have different user costs for the same house.  The exogenous 
property tax component of this user cost then works as an instrument to solve the main 
identification problem of revealed preference models - the correlation between price and 
unobserved quality of the product. 
                                                 
* I am grateful to David Card and Kenneth Chay for their invaluable guidance and support.  I also would like to 
thank Patrick Bayer, Tom Davidoff, David Lee, Robert McMillan, Edward Miguel, Aviv Nevo, John Quigley, 
Steven Raphael, Kim Rueben, Emmanuel Saez, and participants in the UC Berkeley Labor Seminar and UC 
Berkeley Real Estate Seminar for providing many comments and suggestions.  This research was partially conducted 
at the California Census Research Data Center; my thanks to the CCRDC, especially to Henry Brady, Andrew 
Hildreth and Ritch Milby.  I gratefully acknowledge the financial support for this dissertation provided by the 
CAPES-Brazil, CCRDC, IBER-UC Berkeley and UC Berkeley Graduate Division. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Household sorting in the urban housing market has attracted the attention of economists 
since the pioneering work of Tiebout (1956).1  Empirical research on local public finance, school 
choice, and segregation patterns, for example, generally apply equilibrium sorting concepts 
originated in this literature.2  In spite of its elegance, however, some of the Tiebout assumptions 
may not be credible, such as the free mobility of households.3  In reality, transaction costs and 
other barriers to sorting systematically affect individual behavior, although it is a difficult task to 
precisely measure those costs.4 
In this paper I study the impact of one type of transaction costs – moving costs 
generated by property tax laws - on household mobility and how it can be used to recover 
preference parameters in a residential sorting model.  The key insight is that in states where 
property taxes are based on historical prices rather than current market values, potential house 
buyers have different user costs for the same property.  This research focuses on housing 
demand in California, where Proposition 13, passed in 1978, created unusually wide variation in 
property tax rates. 5 
                                                 
1 Much of the intuition on household sorting was derived from a long line of theoretical work in local public finance 
that started in Tiebout (1956), and which includes Epple and Zelenitz (1981), Epple, Filimon, and Romer (1984, 
1993), Benabou (1993), Nechyba (1997) and Epple and Sieg (1999). 
2 Recent examples are found in Barrow and Rouse (2000), Rothstein (2003) and Bayer, McMillan and Rueben 
(2002). 
3 As Rubinfeld (1987) points out “the value and usefulness of the Tiebout model is likely to diminish in the future, 
and an alternative or alternatives are needed.” 
4 See Quigley (2001) for a survey on the different types of transaction costs. 
5 The passage of Proposition 13 in 1978 was the most important public finance event in recent California history.  
Its effects still reverberate today, as recurrent state budget pressures lead to under funding of education and other 
essential public services.  Several papers, such as Shapiro and Sonstelie (1982a), Shapiro and Sonstelie (1982b), 
Fischel (1989), Silva and Sonstelie (1995) and Brunner and Rueben (2001) study the fiscal consequences of 
Proposition 13. More recently, the news media focused its attention in the California budget crisis.  For example, 
Paul Krugman in his New York Times editorial of 08/22/2003 wrote “What is true [about the budget crisis] is that 
California's taxes are highly inequitable: thanks to Proposition 13, some people pay ridiculously low property taxes. 
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Proposition 13 replaced a decentralized system of property tax rates around 2-3% of 
assessed house values, with a uniform 1% fixed rate, based on prices at the time of purchase.  
The immediate effect of Proposition 13 was a one-time reduction in local property tax 
revenues.6  The longer-run impact was to create a system of “grand-fathered” tax rates for 
houses based on historical prices.  The associated tax savings can be substantial: Considering the 
one quarter of San Francisco Bay Area families with more than 20 years of housing tenure in 
1990, I estimate that these savings amounted to an average of 4.5% of household gross annual 
income.7  The grand-fathering of tax rates therefore creates a “lock-in” effect, since a 
homeowner who moves to another home may experience a large increase in tax liability.8 
However, under a pair of propositions passed in the late 1980’s (Proposition 60 in 1986, 
and Proposition 90 in 1988), homeowners aged 55 or older who sell a property and buy another 
of equal or lesser value are allowed to keep the tax base value of their original home.  These laws 
created a sharp discontinuity in the lock-in effect of Proposition 13, giving rise to an interesting 
natural experiment for estimating the impact of moving costs on mobility. 
The first goal of this paper is to estimate the lock-in effect attributable to Proposition 13 
by comparing householders who are 54 years old to those who are 55.9  I find that 55-year olds 
                                                                                                                                                       
Warren Buffett offered the perfect example: he pays $14,401 in property taxes on his $500,000 home in Omaha, but 
only $2,264 on his $4 million home in Orange County.” 
6 Total property tax revenues in California declined by 45% in 1978-1979.  Also, the share of local counties` revenue 
from property taxes declined from 33% in 1977-1978 to 11.6% in 1995-1996 – see Silva and Sonstelie (1995). 
7  In California the implicit tax benefit reached 3% of the gross income for the same selected group of households. 
These calculations are explained in Section 3. 
8 This type of effect is analogous to the spatial lock-in related to falling housing prices, as in Caplin, Freeman and 
Tracy (1997) and Chan (2001), or due to increase in interest rates, as in Quigley (1987).  Other types of lock-in 
occur on capital gain taxation, see Auerbach (1992), wages, see Akerlof, Rose and Yellen (1990), and job-lock due to 
health insurance, see Madrian (1994). 
9 Few papers look at the effects of Proposition 13 on mobility.  Sexton, Sheffrin and O’Sullivan (1995, 1995a) use a 
simulation model to compute how mobility changes in a switch to an acquisition-value tax. Sexton, Sheffrin and 
O’Sullivan (1999) report descriptive statistics with the individuals most benefited by the tax discount due to increase 
in prices. Nagy (1997) looks at mobility rates before and after the law approval, finding no significant effects (the 
lock-in effect could only have an impact after a significant house prices increase). Rosen (1982) looks at the way 
interjurisdicion capitalization changed after Proposition 13.  He found that each dollar decrease in relative property 
taxes led to a seven dollar increase in house values, provided no reduction in local public services. 
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have a 1.2-1.5 percentage point higher rate of moving (on a base of approximately 4%).  
Consistent with a tax-based explanation for this difference, 55-year old recent movers paid 15% 
less property taxes than their 54-year old counterparts.  To check whether this change in 
mobility is due to other discontinuous trends, I look at mobility rates for various control groups, 
including California homeowners in 1980 and renters in 1990, and Texas homeowners in 1990.  
In all, I find no evidence of a discontinuity.  Moreover, there are no differences in property taxes 
paid by 54 and 55-year old recent movers for these control groups. 
The second goal of this study is to explicitly incorporate transaction costs due to 
Proposition 13 in a household location decision model.  The output from this revealed 
preference model consists of a set of underlying taste parameters for housing and neighborhood 
characteristics, which are of special interest for understanding sorting patterns and valuation of 
local public amenities.  Here I adopt estimation strategies first used by McFadden (1974 and 
1978), and recently updated by Berry (1994) and Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (1995).10 
There are two main differences between my method and other revealed preference 
models.  First, I create a user cost of the house that is specific to each homeowner, representing 
a combination of prices and property taxes.  Second, I use the variation in moving costs created 
by Proposition 13 as an instrument to control for the correlation between price and the 
unobserved housing quality.11 
The implementation of this sorting model is only feasible using the 1990 California 
Decennial Census Long Form data, which is a 15% sample.  These are restricted-access micro 
                                                 
10 For a detailed explanation of the random coefficients multinomial logit model, see Nevo (2000). A review of the 
earlier literature can be found in Train (2000). 
11 It is very hard to find credible instruments to control for the correlation between prices and unobserved housing 
quality in the literature.  Bajari and Kahn (2001) estimate bounds on willingness to pay for distance to work in order 
to avoid the use of instruments.  Bayer, Ferreira and McMillan (2003) instrument price with a quasi optimal 
instrument derived from the choice model and from land use measures, to estimate valuation of school quality.  In 
the automobile case, Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (1995) use functions of cost and demand characteristics of all 
products in a given year as instruments, where the functions are defined as optimal instruments using polynomial 
approximations. 
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data, with information for approximately two million households in California, including the 
property taxes paid by each.  Unlike the publicly available micro sample, in which the smallest 
geographic area contains 100,000 individuals, the 15% sample reveals the location of each house 
and work place at the Census block level, a region with approximately 100 individuals.  This 
special feature allows me to precisely define neighborhoods, and at the same time incorporate a 
rich set of observed heterogeneity, such as income, race, age and distance to work. 
Simple multinomial logit estimates of the sorting model generate a relatively small user 
cost coefficient, indicating very high preferences for certain housing characteristics.  This result 
is typical of an omitted variable bias situation: given that we do not observe all housing 
amenities, prices tend to be higher for houses with valuable unobserved attributes.  This 
problem can be solved by including a control function, in which differences in the tax cost 
across houses attributable to Proposition 13 work as an instrumental variable for the user cost.12 
Preference parameter estimates from the adjusted model are then used to recover 
estimates of the marginal willingness to pay (MWTP) for housing and neighborhood attributes.  
I find that homeowners are willing to pay, on average, annually $1,900 for one extra room, 
$4,100 for a detached house (compared to other housing types), and $1,300 to live in a 
neighborhood with $10,000 higher average income.  These results hold after the inclusion of 
heterogeneity and wealth effects.  Interestingly, the same estimation method breaks down when 
applied to Texas, given the lack of meaningful variation in property taxes for that state. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 explains Proposition 13 in detail.  
Section 3 describes the data set, and provides descriptive statistics to analyze the beneficiaries of 
Proposition 13.  Section 4 estimates the lock-in effect. Section 5 presents a household residential 
location model, and estimates of MWTP for housing characteristics.  Section 6 concludes. 
                                                 
12 Section 5.4 provides specification tests for the instruments and a detailed investigation of the sources of 
identification of the sorting model. 
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2. Proposition 13 
 
Proposition 13 was approved in 1978 by 65% of the voters in California.  The vote was 
widely interpreted as a “tax revolt” against the state government.13  In the mid-1970’s, property 
tax revenues in California were quickly fueled by sky-rocketing house prices and the 
unwillingness of local officials to cut property tax rates in the face of a growing tax base.  
Advocates of the proposition argued that tax increases were forcing elderly and low-income 
families to sell their homes.  At the same time, school spending the state was dramatically 
changing in response to the California Supreme Court’s decision, Serrano vs Priest (1971), which 
required the equalization of spending per pupil across school districts.  Fischel (1985) argues that 
the cost of the equalization program provoked a reaction by the voters in the form of restricting 
government revenues through Proposition 13. 
Proposition 13 states that “the maximum amount of any ad valorem tax on real property 
shall not exceed one percent (1%) of the full cash value of such property”14.  Full cash value 
means price at the time of purchase plus a maximum inflation adjustment of 2 percent per year.  
No re-assessment could be carried out, implying that property taxes are effectively frozen (apart 
from the 2% per year rise).15 
The law had two other important sections.  First, although property taxes were fixed at 
1% for all local governances, this limitation would not apply to additional taxes to pay for bonds 
                                                 
13 In the “Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Association: dedicated to protecting Proposition 13 and promoting taxpayers` 
rights” website, for example, we can find citations like “Proposition 13 has reached the exalted status of a symbol – 
for taxpayer revolt and people controlling the power of their government”. 
14 California Constitution, Article XIIIa. 
15 “The full cash value base may reflect from year to year the inflationary rate not to exceed 2 percent for any given 
year or reduction as shown in the consumer price index or comparable data for the area under taxing jurisdiction, or 
may be reduced to reflect substantial damage, destruction or other factors causing a decline in value.” California 
Constitution, Article XIIIa.  It is interesting to note that the initial base values used to set property taxes were the 
assessed housing values of 1975/1976. 
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approved by voters before 1978, and beginning in 1984 for new bonds approved by a super-
majority of voter.16  Second, Proposition 13 required that any new taxes proposed by the state 
legislature had to be approved by a two-thirds majority of each house.17,18 
Two important modifications to Proposition 13 were enacted during the next decade.  
Proposition 60 was a constitutional amendment approved in 1986, which allowed the transfer of 
tax benefits for within-county movers.  Proposition 60 permits a transfer of a Proposition 13 
base year value of the property from the current residence to a replacement dwelling if: a) 
homeowners are at least 55 years old; and b) the replacement dwelling is of equal or lesser value 
than the selling price of the old property.  In practice, Proposition 60 enabled 55-year or older 
households to carry the frozen property taxes to a new home within the same county.19 
Proposition 90, approved in 1988, brought even more flexibility, allowing inter-county 
base year value transfers.  Adoption of Proposition 90 was not mandatory and the law only 
applies across counties that approved the ordinance.  Only a few, albeit relatively large, counties 
in California adopted Proposition 90 immediately after approval of the law, namely:  Alameda, 
Contra Costa, Inyo, Kern, Los Angeles, Marin, Modoc, Monterrey, Orange, Riverside, San 
Diego, San Mateo, Santa Clara, and Ventura.20 
 
 
                                                 
16 Other local taxes and fees have increasingly required voter approval – see Rueben and Cerdan (2003). 
17 California Constitution Article XIIIa. 
18 Other interesting details of the law are: ability to transfer the tax benefit to a spouse or children, exemption for 
disabled households and exemption for $7,000 of the house value when occupied by an owner as his principal 
residence. Also, owners are allowed to use real estate taxes as itemized deductions on Federal income taxes. 
19 Although anecdotal evidence indicates that Proposition 60 was approved because of the pressure made by the 
same Proposition 13 voters, the rationale of this law according to the Legislative Analyst’s Office website is that 
“…it removes a disincentive for senior citizens who no longer need family-sized dwellings or dwellings located near 
schools or places of employment to move to more suitable homes, thereby increasing the availability of suitable 
housing for younger families.” 
20 60% of the state population is located in these counties.  Four of those counties have subsequently repealed the 
ordinance: Contra Costa, Inyo, Marin and Riverside. 
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3. Data set 
 
The Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS) 5% samples of the 1980 and 1990 
for the states of California and Texas are the main source of data for this paper.  I also use the 
California Decennial Census Long Form data, a 15% sample, to estimate the model developed in 
section 5.21  In addition to containing precise location information, the Long Form database also 
includes more complete data on key variables, such as property taxes.  In particular, although the 
public use files of the Census top code property taxes at $5,000 and report only discrete ranges 
of taxes, the restricted Long Form data have the exact property tax paid by all households up to 
a $15,000 cap. 
Table 1 shows a summary of the main Census variables for California and Texas in 1980 
and 1990.  Column (1) shows averages of house values, property taxes, effective tax rates 
(individual house values divided by property taxes), house and household characteristics for the 
full sample.  Columns (2)-(7) have the same averages for different subgroups, by date when they 
moved into their home.  The choice of Texas as comparison group comes from the fact that 
house values are re-assessed every two to three years in that state. 
A striking feature of these data is the gap in effective property taxes paid by homeowners 
of different tenures in California in 1990.  While homeowners who had moved in the previous 
year paid an effective tax rate of 0.8% on average, households living in the same dwelling for 
more than a decade paid less than 0.44%.  This discrepancy corresponds to a tax saving of $900 
per year in 1990 dollars.  If we focus on the implicit tax benefit – the difference between current 
property taxes and 1% of house values - for households who moved in before 1979, this number 
can reach almost 3% of household gross annual income.  In some places, such as the San 
                                                 
21 Only part of the analysis is conducted with the 15% sample because of delays in getting access to the restricted 
data. 
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Francisco Bay Area, the implicit tax benefit reached almost 4.5% of gross income for the same 
selected group of households. 
When looking at California in 1980, by comparison, we only see a small difference in 
effective property taxes between homeowners who moved before 1975 and those who moved 
after.22  This is the initial consequence of Proposition 13, when property taxes were set at 1% of 
house values assessed in 1975.  As opposed to California, the Texas data show relatively stable 
effective property tax rates.  Only households who moved before 1970 have discounts in 
property taxes, presumably because Texas offers special deductions for householders 65 years of 
age and older. 
Interestingly, we do not observe differences across tenure groups or the number of 
rooms in California in 1990.  Other housing amenities, such as housing type and year of 
construction, have a strong tenure gradient.  As expected, we also observe an “age” gradient, 
given that tenure is correlated with age.  Also, long tenure homeowners are more likely to have 
lower income and lower education than others.  The same trends are observed in Texas, 
although house values are slightly positively correlated with age of the units in Texas. 
Figure 1 plots effective property tax rates by age for California homeowners in 1990.  
The distributional effects of Proposition 13 are clear: elderly (long tenure) households pay less 
property tax than younger (recent movers) households.  When normalizing property taxes by 
annual household income instead of house values (Figure 2) the distributional effects of 
Proposition 13 are less pronounced.  The main characteristic is that individuals between 50-60 
years of age pay less tax as a proportion of their income compared to other age groups.  This 
might reflect the age profile of income, where maximum income is generally achieved around 
                                                 
22 Half of the 1980 sample was not included because the Census did not process the mobility information for a 
random sample of half of the population.  This scheme was applied to reduce costs of processing the information 
from mobility variables. 
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age 50.  In comparing current taxes with a counterfactual 1% of housing values as property 
taxes, the gap between what Californians should pay in a different regime is much larger for the 
elderly.  The same pattern of implicit tax benefits is observed for low-income householders, as 
plotted in Figure 3. 
 
 
4. Lock-in Effect 
 
The lock-in effect of Proposition 13 arises because of the implicit tax break for 
households who have been living in the same house for a long time.  To the best of my 
knowledge, there is no formal analysis of the magnitude of the lock-in effect in the literature.  
This paper is the first research to identify the lock-in, by looking after age 55, when the lock-in 
effect is removed. 
Figure 4 illustrates the key insight of the new research design.  It graphs the probability 
of moving to a new house in 1990 by age group.  Each dot in Figure 4 is calculated as the total 
number of homeowners who moved in the last year, divided by the total number of 
homeowners from the respective age.  From now on, age is defined as the maximum age 
between householder and spouse, to correspond with the provisions of Propositions 60 and 90. 
A sharp discontinuity arises between 54 and 55-year olds.  The probability of moving for 
a 54-year old is 4% while for 55 year olds it reaches 5.2%.  This 1.2% point difference is 
presumably caused by the effect of Propositions 60 and 90.  The remainder of this section 
presents a variety of tests of this interpretation. 
In order to rule out competing hypothesis, I compare 1990 California data with several 
control groups, such as California data from 1980, before Propositions 60 and 90 had been 
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approved.  Figure 5 graphs the probability of moving for this group, where only the negative 
relationship between mobility and age is found.  This comparison rules out any type of special 
Californian mobility pattern as the explanation for the sharp change in mobility rates. 
Figure 6 plots the probability of moving for renters in California 1990. Again, no 
discontinuity is found for the relevant age group.  The existence of a 1989-1990 localized year 
effect is ruled out by this comparison.  Figure 7 plots the probability of moving for homeowners 
in Texas in 1990.  Again, no discontinuity is found, allowing me to rule out national economic 
shocks or trends as cause of the change in mobility rates for 55-years old in California in 1990. 
Table 2 reports results from a probit model, designed to quantify the patterns observed 
in the figures above.  The following reduced form equation for the probability of moving in 
1990 is estimated: 
 
(1) )()Pr( 34
2
32
55
1 iiiii AgeAgeAgeDmoving δδδδ +++Φ=  
 
where 55iD  is a dummy for 55-year or older and ( )⋅Φ  is the normal c.d.f..  The extra age controls 
are included in the equation because the effect of age on mobility is non-linear.  Column (1) 
shows a negative correlation between 55iD  and the probability of moving, due to the negative 
impact of age on mobility rates.  Column (3) adds the polynomial in age, leading to a change in 
the sign of the age 55 and older dummy, and setting the effect of 55iD  on mobility in 1.5% 
points (with t-stat 5.2).  This result is unchanged with the addition of house attributes, 
household characteristics or fixed effects at the metropolitan area.  Pooling the 1990 California 
data with 1980 California data or the 1990 Texas data increases the estimated effect to 1.7% and 
2% respectively, which is consistent with the downward trend in mobility rates observed in 
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those control groups. 
Two other consistency checks are presented in Table 2.  First, I exclude 54 to 55-year 
households from the sample.  This test verifies the existence of a structural change in mobility 
rates as opposed to only 54-years homeowners delaying mobility until they are 55 years old.  
Again, results are very similar to the initial estimates.  Finally, I estimate the mean marginal effect 
of age instead of the marginal effect at the mean, finding a 1.7% change in mobility rates. 
It is important to note that the reduced form results hold for the full local population of 
54 and 55-year old, independent of their moving status.  Given the 1-year difference in both 
cohorts, there is no reason to expect differences in preferences or average characteristics of 
those households.  Table 3 reports average values for relevant characteristics for 52-57-year old 
homeowners.  A smooth trend is the main characteristic in most variables, without any sharp 
discontinuity between 54 and 55-year olds, as expected.  All the comparisons above point out to 
a causal relationship between the ability to transfer the tax benefit and mobility rates.23 
 
4.1. Consistency checks 
The main consistency check relates to the ability of transferring the tax benefit.  If recent 
movers in fact used Propositions 60 and 90, a discontinuity in property taxes payments would be 
expected.  Figure 8 shows average property taxes by age.  The gap between 54 and 55 year olds 
is approximately $200, and is only noticeable in California in 1990.  Figure 9 and Figure 10 show 
the same numbers for California in 1980 and Texas in 1990.  In both cases, only a downward 
trend in property taxes payments is observed, especially for Texas, where 65 year of age or older 
                                                 
23 A remaining question relates to how permanent or transitory are the effects of Propositions 60 and 90.  Given 
that we are looking at mobility rates in 1989-1990, 3 years after Proposition 60’s approval and 1 year after 
Proposition 90, potentially these analyses capture mobility for a stock of households that were mismatched for 
some period of time.  The Census 2000 would be ideal to confirm the change in mobility patterns.  Unfortunately, 
the Census 2000 has extremely high allocation rates.  For example, almost 50% of house values were not reported.  
The high non-response rates generated counterintuitive mobility rates of 8-9 percentage points for the 54-55-year 
old homeowners, departing from a pattern of reduction in mobility rates over time. 
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households enjoy several deductions in their tax payments.  Figures 11, 12 and 13 compare 
effective property tax rates faced by new movers in California 1990, California 1980 and Texas 
1990 respectively.  Again, the discontinuity is only present in the 1990 California data.  Table 4 
shows estimates of this difference, which is of 0.08% (compared to an average tax rate of 0.8% 
for all recent movers). 
The $200 gap in taxes between 54 and 55 year old Californians in 1990 seems a small 
number compared to the differences in property tax payments reported in Table 1.  If long 
tenure households were moving in 1989-1990 in similar proportions, i.e., “when moved in” 
groups were contributing with proportional number of recent movers, the expected average gap 
would be $536.  This indicates that long tenure homeowners were probably moving with lower 
rates than short tenure homeowners.  Also, 55-year old homeowners moving to more expensive 
houses are not allowed to transfer the tax benefit. 
A second explanation for the small gap is that counties in California take 6 to 7 months 
to actually transfer the tax benefit.  Once a family moves to a new place, the householder has to 
visit the county office and request the transfer of base values.  After the request is accepted, it 
takes 6-7 months for the approval process.  Meanwhile, households pay higher tax rates, only 
receiving the re-fund in the next payment.  Given that most households filled the Census 
questionnaire in the beginning of 1990, we should expect to see a fair proportion of households 
reporting higher property taxes than they actually have to pay.24 
Families moving to counties that did not allow Proposition 90 are a third explanation for 
the modest tax difference.  Figure 13 shows the probability of moving for California 1990 split 
in two groups: movers who could transfer the tax benefit (because of Proposition 60 or 90) and 
movers who could not (because Proposition 90 was not allowed).  The comparison is made 
                                                 
24 The 1990 Census question for property taxes was: “What were the real estate taxes on THIS property last year?” 
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using the Census question: “Where did this person live 5 years ago (on April 1, 1985)?” 22% of 
the 54 and 55-year olds recent homeowners moved to places that did not accept Proposition 90.  
Figure 14 also allows me to calculate the discontinuity in both groups.  Only the group allowed 
to transfer the tax benefit had a gap of .95% points between probabilities of moving for 54 and 
55 years old.  The same comparison is made in Figure 15, but plotting average property taxes 
instead of mobility rates.  Not surprisingly, the gap between 54 and 55-year old increased to $300 
when comparing the predicted average property taxes. 
A final explanation for the $200 gap instead of $536 is that some of the new movers may 
have been renters in the previous house.  Although I am not able to verify it in the Census data, 
there are two indications that this number is significant.  First, the proportion of 54-55 years old 
non-movers who are renters is 20% for California in 1990.  Also, the March CPS started to 
collect answers to the question “What was (your/name) main reason for moving?” in 1998.  
Table 5 has the frequency of answers by age groups for the whole US.  Only 16.2% of the 50-59 
years of age households pointed out “wanted to own home, not rent” as the main reason to 
move.  This proportion is larger for younger cohorts, as younger families buy their first house. 
Older cohorts, on the other hand, are more likely to move after retirement and less likely 
to move because of change in marital status.   Interestingly, the main reason for moving is due to 
housing and neighborhood quality.  This provides extra incentive for calculating MWTP for 
housing and neighborhood characteristics in Section 5, when the variation in moving costs is 
used an instrument to control for the correlation between price and unobserved quality of the 
neighborhood. 
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5. Residential Location Decisions Model 
 
In this section I develop a household residential demand model, 25 where the focus is on 
the incorporation of transaction costs represented by Proposition 13.  Taxation costs are 
included into the model and used as a device to recover estimates of the marginal willingness to 
pay (MWTP) estimates for housing and neighborhood attributes.  The key insight of the model 
is the construction of a user cost for a house that varies across people.  The property tax 
differences created by Proposition 13 provides exogenous variation in user costs, and can be 
used as an instrumental variable to reduce the influence of unobserved house characteristics in 
estimating MWTP.26 
The model is based on standard differentiated product demand models, whose roots lie 
in the work of McFadden (1973,1978) and more recently Berry (1994) and Berry, Levinsohn and 
Pakes - BLP (1995).  The central idea is that demand parameters can be recovered from 
observed choices in the housing market, where houses are considered as bundles of 
characteristics.  Households choose to live in the house that maximizes expected utility derived 
from housing and location attributes. 
A number of existing studies have used similar or related frameworks to estimate 
preferences for housing and neighborhood characteristics.  Palmquist (1984) directly estimated 
demand for certain house characteristics in seven metropolitan areas using the hedonic approach 
developed by Rosen (1974).27  Quigley (1985) applied a discrete choice model to recover 
                                                 
25  The supply side is not modeled in this paper.  The housing supply is assumed to be fixed in all estimates. 
26 To implement this identification strategy, a control function technique is used.  Hausman (1978), Heckman 
(1978) and Smith and Blundell (1986) initially developed the method, and it can be thought as a two-stage least 
square approach applied to non-linear models. Blundell and Powell (2001) expanded the control function ideas in a 
semi-parametric and non-parametric estimation.  Applications of the control function are found in Villas-Boas and 
Winer (1999) and Petrin and Train (2002). 
27  Sheppard (1997) provides an overview of the problems associated with hedonics analysis of housing markets and 
the empirical problems associated with this branch of the literature. 
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preferences for housing and neighborhood attributes in Pittsburgh.  Recently, several papers 
adapted the BLP approach to the housing market, including Bajari and Kahn (2000), Bayer, 
McMillan and Rueben (2003) and Bayer, Ferreira and McMillan (2003).  These last two papers 
also develop an equilibrium model of the housing market, allowing the estimation of general 
equilibrium simulations to evaluate changes in policy.  None of these papers, however, explicitly 
takes into account the variation in user costs of alternative housing units posed by Proposition 
13 or similar laws in other states. 
 
5.1. The model 
Assume that household i maximizes utility by choosing among alternative houses 
indexed by j.  The indirect utility of household i from consuming house j, 
);,,,,( θξτ jijijj zxpU , is defined as a function of housing prices jp , the property taxes paid by 
each homeowner ijτ , a vector of housing amenities jx , a vector of observed household 
characteristics iz  - including annual household income iI , unobserved attributes of the house 
jξ  and a vector of unknown parameters θ  defining mean and heterogeneity in preferences.  I 
adopt the following functional form: 
 
(2) ijjijijiiij xpIgu εξβα +++−= )(  
 
where )(⋅g  is a monotonic function, ijε  is the stochastic term, and iα  and iβ  are preferences 
for housing prices and attributes.  Each parameter associated with the choice variables in the 
model varies with a household’s own characteristics according to: 
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and equations (3a) and (3b) describe household i’s preference for housing characteristic m.  The 
term ijp , which I call the user cost of the house in a given year, is defined as: 
 
(4) ijjij rpp τ+=  
 
where r is the annual interest rate.  The user cost of the house is composed by a common 
carrying cost jrp  faced by all individuals, and property taxes ijτ specific to each homeowner. 
Alternative choices for the function )(⋅g  determine whether there are income effects in 
the marginal willingness to pay for amenities.  The MWTP by household i for amenity j is: 
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If ijiiji pIpIg −=− )(  then the MWTP is just 
i
m
i
α
β
− . On the other hand, if 
)log()( ijiiji pIpIg −=− , as would be the case under a Cobb-Douglas specification of 
preferences,28 then: 
 
(6) )( iji
i
m
i
ij pIMWTP −= α
β
 
 
which is increasing with income net of housing costs. 
Given the household’s problem described in equations (2)-(4), household i choose 
housing choice j if the utility that it receives from this choice exceeds the utility that it receives 
from all other possible house choices, i.e., 
  
(7) jkWWWWuu ijikikijikikijijikij ≠∀−>−⇒+>+⇒> εεεε   
 
where ijW  includes all of the non-idiosyncratic components of the indirect utility described in 
(2).  As the inequalities in (7) imply, the probability that a household chooses any particular 
choice depends in general on the characteristics of the full set of possible house choices. 
Assuming ijε  follows an iid extreme value distribution, the probability of household i 
choosing house j from choice set J has the following functional form: 
 
                                                 
28 See Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (1995). 
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Maximizing the probability that each household makes the correct housing choice gives 
rise to the following log-likelihood function: 
 
(9) ∑∑ Π=
i j
ijijL )ln(1  
 
where ij1  is an indicator variable that is equal to one if household i chooses house j and zero 
otherwise.  
 
5.2. Endogeneity problems 
The main concern that arises is estimating MWTP in the framework of equations (2)-(9) 
comes from the correlation between price and the unobserved portion of the utility.  This 
correlation is caused by omitted variables – the econometrician does not observe all 
characteristics of the house that affects utility, i.e., prices tend to be higher for houses with 
valuable unobserved attributes. 
Most papers on demand for differentiated products have used two methods to solve this 
problem: the control function approach or the BLP method.29  The main problem with both 
approaches is the difficulty in finding instruments correlated with price and uncorrelated with 
the mean utility that all households share from each house.  In this paper, I choose the control 
                                                 
29 In the control function, a set of instrumental variables is used in a first stage regression of prices on housing 
attributes.  In the second stage, a function of the first stage predicted residuals is included in the choice model.  In 
the BLP, a series of mean utilities derived from market shares are estimated in the choice model.  The mean utilities 
are then regressed on price, housing variables, and the price instrument. 
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function approach over the BLP method because of the high number of products in the housing 
market, leading to complications in estimating mean utilities for each product.30 
The variation in taxation costs faced by homeowners in California is key element in the 
identification strategy.  The instrument corresponds to the “clean” variation in ijp  and it 
exogenously change according to Propositions 13, 60 and 90.  Proposition 13 gives the variation 
in implicit tax benefits faced by homeowners.  Propositions 60 and 90 set the moving costs 
when householders decide to choose another property.  A complete investigation of the sources 
of identification and potential confounding factors is presented in section 5.4.31 
In practice, I estimate the following first stage for the income effects specification: 
 
(10) ijjijiji xpIg νψλτ ++=− )(  
 
Then, the predicted residual ijνˆ  is incorporated in the utility function as a linear term: 
 
(11) ijijiijijiiij xpIgu ενδβα +++−= ˆ)(  
 
where iδ  also depends on observed household characteristics.32  As evident from equation (11), 
the predicted residual ijνˆ  is a proxy for the unobserved housing quality jξ .33,34 As in traditional 
                                                 
30 Bayer, McMillan and Rueben (2003) show under what conditions a mean utility can be estimated to each house.  
Given the use of houses available in 1989/1990 as the choice set, that approach is not applicable to this study. 
31 In particular, I control for the correlation between property taxes and individual homeowner tenure by looking 
at property tax averages for individuals of same age living in the same neighborhood. 
32 Unobserved heterogeneity is not modeled in this paper because of two reasons.  First, the microdata allows me to 
incorporate a rich set of observed heterogeneity that gives rise to flexible substitution patterns.  Second, it is still 
part of future research how to incorporate BLP type unobserved heterogeneity on models that use random samples 
of alternatives as a choice set. 
33 It is important to emphasize that the control function approach does not have the same properties of the 
traditional BLP approach.  Petrin and Train (2002) show under what conditions the two methods are similar. 
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two-stage least squares estimates, the identification strategy fundamentally relies on the first 
stage results. 
While price endogeneity is the main identification problem of revealed preference 
models, it is not the only one.  In order to estimate the model, it is assumed that house 
characteristics are uncorrelated with the unobserved portion of the utility.  As an example, house 
style or front yard size are assumed to be uncorrelated with number of rooms.  If this is not the 
case, MWTP estimate for an extra room will be biased.  Although this might seem a restrictive 
hypothesis, to my knowledge there is no paper in the housing literature that addresses this 
question.35 
 
5.3. Estimation results 
This section presents estimation results for the preceding model, using data on 98,407 
homeowners between 30 and 70 years of age living in the San Francisco Bay Area and included 
in the 15% restricted use 1990 Census sample.36  The analysis is restricted to residents of a single 
metropolitan area for several reasons.  First, it is a self-contained economic region, with small 
proportion of commuters in and out of the region.  Second, by focusing on a single 
metropolitan area, I restrict attention to alternative housing choices in the same area.  Finally, for 
reasons of tractability and for obtaining permission to use the restricted Census data it is more 
convenient to use data from a single area. 
                                                                                                                                                       
34 I only include a linear function of the residual in the estimates, although the control function allows the inclusion 
of any non-linear function.  As a consistency check, interactions of the predicted residual with choice variables are 
included in the model.  The results are found to be relatively similar with or without the interactions. 
35 Bayer, Ferreira and McMillan (2003) use boundary fixed effects to control for the correlation between unobserved 
quality of the neighborhood and observed neighborhood characteristics but use similar assumption for housing 
characteristics.  All other revealed preference papers, including the non-housing literature, generally assume that all 
covariates (but price) are uncorrelated with unobserved quality of the relevant product. An exception to this rule is 
Chay and Greenstone (2001).  They instrument pollution levels with the Clean Air Act of 1975 to estimate MWTP 
for air quality 
36 The sample is composed of six counties: Alameda, Contra Costa, Marin, San Jose, Santa Clara and San Francisco. 
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In the estimation, each household is assumed to compare the value of their current 
house to the value of a set of alternative houses.  I assume that the set of possible alternatives 
includes houses that were newly purchased in the previous year.   This is best proxy for houses 
available in the market in the year of analysis. 37  For each household in the estimation sample, I 
randomly assign 10 alternative houses from the choice set. 38 
The choice variables include characteristics of the house (draw from the Census data), 
socio-demographic characteristics of the neighborhood (based on averages at the block group 
level from the Census data), and characteristics of the neighborhood from external data, 
including elevation, population density, a measure of local air quality and a measure of 1st grade 
test scores in the nearest public primary school.39 
Table 6 shows the average characteristics of the houses owned by people in the sample 
and of the alternative houses.  The alternative houses have a smaller number of rooms, were 
built more recently and are more likely to be apartments or attached dwellings.  Neighborhood 
characteristics are very similar for both groups, although chosen houses are located in slightly 
whiter and richer block groups. 
From the point of view of the model developed in the last section, the most interesting 
feature of the chosen house versus the alternatives is the property tax.  For the chosen houses, 
                                                 
37 Misspecification of the choice set may lead to serious estimation biases.  Swait (1984) showed, for example, that 
not incorporating captivity to a certain group of alternatives, lead to downward biased estimates for choice 
characteristics and upward biased fixed effects parameters. The logic is simple: when we include in the model 
alternatives not available to individuals (or not considered by them), we are in fact adding extra noise, which will be 
captured by the fixed effects, reducing the importance of observed choice variables. 
38 The consistency of this procedure is guaranteed by the IIA property – see McFadden (1978).  Although IIA 
property dictates substitution patterns among individual alternatives, the inclusion of observed heterogeneity allows 
flexible substitution patters at higher levels of aggregation. Also, the inclusion of distance to work gives rise to more 
reasonable substitution patterns in the urban space. 
39 Elevation is measured at the block level (source: EPA: BASINS - Better Assessment Science Integrating Point 
and Nonpoint Sources).  Population density combines Census data and block group areas drawn from ArcView 
GIS.  Average test scores of 1991-1992 and 1992-1993 academic years are assigned from the closest school within 
the school district, using census block centroids and school latitudes and longitudes (source: California Department 
of Education, 1991-1993).  Air quality is predicted for each census block using information from monitor stations 
(source: Rand California, 1990) and industrial plants (source: EPA – AIRS –Aerometric Information Retrieval 
System). 
 23
the property tax is reported in the Census.  For the alternative, the institutional framework of 
Propositions 13, 60 and 90 is used to generate the taxation costs that a specific household faces 
when choosing that house.  For example, a 30 year old choosing a house from the alternative set 
is assumed to have property taxes calculated as 1% of the house value.40  On the other hand, 
homeowners age 55 or older are allowed to transfer current property tax cost of their current 
home to another house if: a) the housing alternative is of equal or lesser value; b) the 
homeowner is moving within the same county or to a county that accepts Proposition 90.  After 
generating property taxes for all alternatives, the individual user cost of the house is constructed 
as in equation 8, using an interest rate of 6%.  Appendix Table 1 reports the first stage estimates 
of the user cost on property taxes and housing and neighborhood variables for the pooled set of 
houses and alternatives.  As expected, all specifications show a high F-test for the instrumental 
variable. 
Multinomial logit estimates are presented in Table 7.  Column (1) shows preference 
parameters for a model without heterogeneity and assuming that utility is linear in income net of 
housing costs.  I focus on three variables - number of rooms, detached houses and average 
income of the neighborhood – to compare how changes in the model affect housing and 
neighborhood MWTP estimates.  All signs look correct – negative for price and positive for the 
choice variables.  The main problem is the magnitude of the price coefficient, which suggests a 
very small value for the marginal utility of income, or alternatively very high value of willingness 
to pay.  This problem, which has been noted in other studies,41 is arguably due to the fact that 
house prices are correlated with unobserved characteristics of the house.  Looking at columns 
(2)-(4), the estimated coefficient of the user cost variable remains relatively small in magnitude, 
even when including a broad set of housing and neighborhood controls. 
                                                 
40 Self-reported house values from the Census are used to calculate this cost. 
41 See Petrin and Train (2002) and Bayer, McMillan and Rueben (2002), for example. 
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Column (5) reports the estimate results for a specification similar to the one in column 
(4) but with the addition of a control function, equal to the residual of the first stage model for 
the user costs, as indicated in equations (10) and (11).  The coefficient on the control function is 
large and positive, suggesting that unobserved variables that affect price also affect the utility 
assigned to the house.  When the control function is included, the coefficient on the user cost 
rises in magnitude by a factor of 10. 
MWTP estimates derived from the primitives of the model are shown in Table 8.  The 
simplest model shows very high MWTP estimates for housing characteristics - $3,275 per year 
for an extra room and $17,210 for a detached house.  On the other side, MWTP for average 
income of the neighborhood seems too small - $1,081 for a $10,000 higher average income of 
the neighborhood.  Even after including other controls for housing and neighborhood 
amenities, the results still look very similar.  Column (5) shows the inclusion of the control 
function.  As noted in the multinomial logit estimates, the control function has the expected 
effect of deflating the MWTP estimates for housing characteristics ($1,754 for number of rooms 
and $4,186 for a detached house) and increasing the MWTP for average income ($1,381). 
A last change in the model is the inclusion of observed heterogeneity.  Household 
income, age, and a dummy for white are interacted with all choice characteristics, including 
distance to work.  The inclusion of heterogeneity only partially affects the estimates, as noted in 
column (6).  The final MWTP numbers are $1,854 per year for an extra room, $4,088 for a 
detached house and $1,322 for a $10,000 higher average income of the neighborhood.  These 
numbers correspond to a baseline white household with average income and average age. 42 
Finally, wealth effects are included in columns (8) and (9).  Again, the results are 
meaningful only after controlling for unobserved housing quality.  The user cost coefficient sign 
                                                 
42 Estimates in columns (6)-(9) use only 6 alternatives because the model with heterogeneity was not 
computationally feasible to estimate with 10 alternatives. 
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is opposed to the initial estimates because of the use of income net of housing costs.  The 
numbers are $6,135 for number of rooms, $19,749 for a detached house and $4,758 for average 
income of the neighborhood.  In order to compare MWTP estimates with and without wealth 
effects, we first need to normalize the estimates by the correspondent monetary measure – the 
average user cost and the average income net of user cost.  When wealth effects from owning a 
property are considered in the model, homeowners are on average willing to pay 25% more for 
an extra room and for average income, and 75% more for a detached house. 
When comparing these numbers with hedonic price regressions in Table 11, there are 
large differences for the wealth effects specification, with detached house having a negative sign 
for the MWTP estimate.  The differences are also large for housing characteristics in the 
specification free of wealth effects, but similar results are found for average income. 
An interesting way of testing the fitness of the residential demand model is to look at 
predicted mobility rates.  The estimated probabilities of choosing a house from the alternative 
set are used as a proxy for mobility.43  Figure 15 plots these predicted probabilities by age 
groups.  The predicted mobility patterns only resemble the ones showed in Figure 3 when using 
the final specification of the model.  When not using the variation in property taxes to control 
for unobserved components of the house, predicted mobility patterns are almost constant across 
age groups.44 
 
5.4. Sources of identification 
The identification strategy used in the previous section relied on homeowner specific 
moving costs determined by Propositions 13, 60 and 90.  In this section, I provide tests to 
                                                 
43 Predicted probabilities of choosing a house are estimated directly from equation 8. 
44 Both predictions were normalized to the observed mobility rates at age 54.  When comparing predicted mobility 
patterns in levels for the models with and without the control function, it is observed an overall decrease in mobility 
rates after the inclusion of the unobserved component. 
 26
identify the role of each of these propositions.  The implicit tax benefit from Proposition 13 is 
the dominant source of variation.  Because of the correlation between homeowner tenure and 
the tax benefit from Proposition 13, I provide an adjustment to ridit of this source of bias from 
the instrumental variable.  Furthermore, an additional validity test on the functional form of the 
control function is presented at the end of the section. 
In the first test, I apply to the Dallas-TX in 1990 data the same control function 
approach used to estimate housing demand for the San Francisco Bay Area.45  Table 10 shows 
the multinomial logit estimates for the models with and without the control function.  Although 
the control function term in column (2) has a significant coefficient, its magnitude is very small 
compared to a corresponding model applied to the California data (Table 7, column (5)).  Table 
11 reports the respective MWTP estimates.  Results are very similar for both approaches, 
indicating that the control function does not provide new relevant variation to the estimates.  
Given that house values in Texas are re-assessed every two to three years, moving costs 
represented by property taxes are highly correlated with house values.  This is confirmed by the 
first stage estimates in Appendix Table 1, where the user cost regressed on house characteristics 
and the instrument has an R2 of .99. 
In the next test, the institutional framework of Proposition 60 is simulated in Dallas-TX.  
The basic premise of this simulation is to allow homeowners in Texas to transfer their current 
property taxes to a house in the choice set, according to Proposition 60 rules.46  If the structure 
alone were driving the estimates, then one would expect results from this simulation to mirror 
those from the San Francisco Bay Area.  As observed in column (3) of Table 10, however, the 
                                                 
45 The public use Census data was used to estimate the model for Dallas-TX.  This was due to delays in getting 
access to the Texas restricted Census micro data. 
46 If the homeowners are 54 years of age or younger, then property taxes for the alternative houses are set at 1.4% 
of the house value - which corresponds to the average effective property taxes in Dallas.  If homeowners are 55 
years of age or older, they are allowed to transfer the tax benefit (if it is profitable to do so). 
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simulated structure does not guarantee a strong first stage, and the MWTP estimates are very 
similar to the model without Proposition 60. 
These tests indicate that the variation in property taxes due to Proposition 13 is driving 
the results.  The intuition is that Proposition 13 is the source of individual specific monetary 
losses that occur when homeowners move to another house.  In order to confirm this idea, I 
estimate a model for a sub-sample of homeowners from ages 30 to 49.  This selection of 
homeowners rules out incentives in delaying mobility for individuals close to 55 year of age as 
the relevant variant of the instrument.  Columns (4) and (5) in Table 11 show the results for the 
30 to 49-year old sub-sample.  The estimates reveal patterns similar to those found in the full 
sample, with the control function working effectively. 
Interestingly, the tax benefit alone is not enough to shift the estimates.  Column (6) 
reports results from a model that simulates households being allowed to transfer their tax benefit 
to another house without restrictions.  The first stage, as reported in Appendix Table 1, is not 
strong enough and MWTP estimates are meaningless because of the lack of variation in moving 
costs.  This is confirmed when estimating a model for a second sub-sample, now composed of 
60 to 70-year old homeowners.  As reported in Table 11, the control function is effective 
because homeowners cannot transfer the tax benefit to all houses nor is it not profitable to do 
so47 On the other hand, when I simulate unrestricted transfer benefits in column (9), the 
estimates are meaningless because of the lack of variation in the first stage. 
A potential concern about using moving costs as source of identification is the 
instrument’s correlation with homeowner tenure.  If the instrument is correlated with tenure, 
then it is also potentially correlated with unobserved housing quality, undermining the 
identification strategy.  A simple regression of property taxes on tenure produces an R2 of .15.  
                                                 
47 For example, when the new house has a very small price and the tax benefit is higher than 1% of the new house 
value. 
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In order to address this issue, an alternative specification is used for the instrument, where the 
variable individual tenure is decomposed out of moving costs.  I then apply the adjusted 
instrument to the 30 to 49-year old sample and compare the estimates with the initial instrument. 
The procedure works as follows:  First, the effective property tax rates are estimated for 
each homeowner.  Then, block group average effective tax rates are calculated for homeowners 
in four age groups, namely 30-34, 35-39, 40-44 and 45-49 year olds.  Finally, the house value of 
each homeowner is multiplied by the relevant average effective tax rate.  In doing so, the 
correlation of the instrument with individual homeowner tenure is mitigated, leaving an adjusted 
property tax that is a function of past housing values in the same neighborhood for people of 
the same age group.  As expected, I find an R2 of only .04 for the regression of the adjusted 
instrument on homeowner tenure.  Column (7) in Table 11 shows the estimates for a model that 
uses the adjusted instrument.  Although standard errors are higher than in the model with the 
regular instrument, MWTP estimates are relatively similar - the main difference is that estimates 
for average income of the neighborhood increases from $1,197 to $1,602. 
A final robustness check is performed on the functional form of the utility function.  
The unobserved quality of the housing component was assumed to be separable additive in both 
the utility function and the first stage regression.  If this is not the case, estimates from the 
model are potentially biased.  To address this concern, the predicted residual is interacted with 
the choice variables in the model.  Column (7) in Table 8 shows small differences between the 
results with or without the interaction terms, besides the expected increase in standard errors. 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
Given that homeownership is the primary way in which families accumulate wealth, 
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understanding housing demand is of special importance in evaluating questions of welfare and 
equity across household types.  Unfortunately, existing economic models that predict sorting in 
the urban landscape generally assume no barriers to household sorting due to transaction costs.  
In reality, it is hardly credible to assume that such frictions do not affect the housing market. 
In this paper I provide clear evidence that transaction costs affect individual behavior.  
Using a natural experiment design generated by California’s Propositions 13, 60 and 90, I show a 
distinct effect of property tax variations on household mobility.  This analysis also indicates that 
individuals may face differentiated prices in the market and that such variation can be used as a 
source of identification for revealed preference models of housing demand.  Given this 
evidence, economic models that fail to incorporate these moving costs may provide biased 
predictions of choice behavior. 
This study leads me towards two other areas of research to be explored in future work.  
First, the housing market has important dynamic components that have been neglected in the 
existing literature.  Despite a woeful lack of panel data, there is still much that can be learned 
with the combination of theoretical modeling and cross-sectional comparisons.  Second, the 
welfare consequences of barriers to optimal housing sorting have yet to be analyzed.  This is of 
special interest to understanding the effects of transaction costs on neighborhood composition, 
and on housing consumption patterns of younger families.  
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Figure 1. Effective property tax rates by homeowner age, California 1990. 
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Source: 1990 IPUMS. Notes: Effective property tax rates are calculated as property taxes divided by house values. Age is the 
maximum between age of the head of the house and spouse. 
 
Figure 2. Property taxes/household income ratio by age, California 1990. 
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Source: 1990 IPUMS. Notes: Counterfactual ratios are calculated as 1% of house values divided by household income.  Age is 
the maximum between age of the head of the house and spouse. 
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Figure 3. Property taxes/household income ratio by income quantile, California 1990. 
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Source 1990 IPUMS. Notes: Counterfactual ratios are calculated as 1% of house values divided by household income.  Age is the 
maximum between age of the head of the house and spouse. 
 
Figure 4. Probability of moving for homeowners by age, California 1990. 
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Source: 1990 IPUMS. Notes: Each dot represents the probability of moving for homeowners by age, calculated as the number of 
new movers in 1989-1990 divided by the total number of homeowners by age.  Age is the maximum between age of the head of 
the house and spouse.  The thick line is composed by predicted values of a polynomial regression of probability of moving on 
age, dummy for 55-year or older and interactions of these components. 
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Figure 5. Probability of moving for homeowners by age, California 1980. 
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Source: 1980 IPUMS. Notes: Each dot represents the probability of moving for homeowners by age, calculated as the number of 
new movers in 1979-1980 divided by the total number of homeowners by age.  See Figure 4 for other details. 
 
 
Figure 6. Probability of moving for renters by age, California 1990. 
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Source: 1990 IPUMS. Notes: Each dot represents the probability of moving for renters by age, calculated as the number of new 
renters in 1989-1990 divided by the total number of renters by age. See Figure 4 for details. 
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Figure 7. Probability of moving for homeowners by age, Texas 1990. 
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Source: 1990 IPUMS. See Figure 4 for details. 
 
 
Figure 8. Average property taxes for 1989-1990 movers by age, California 1990. 
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Source: 1990 IPUMS.  Notes: Each dot represents the average property taxes faced by each age group. See Figure 4 for details. 
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Figure 9. Average property taxes for 1979-1980 movers by age, California 1980. 
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Source: 1980 IPUMS.  Notes: Each dot represents the average property taxes faced by each age group. See Figure 4 for details. 
 
 
Figure 10. Average property taxes for 1989-1990 movers by age, Texas 1990. 
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Source: 1990 IPUMS. Notes: Each dot represents the average property taxes faced by each age group. See Figure 4 for details. 
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Figure 11. Average effective property tax rates for 1989-1990 movers by age, California 1990. 
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Source: 1990 IPUMS. Notes: Each dot represents the average effective tax rates faced by each age group. See Figure 4 for details. 
 
 
Figure 12. Average effective property tax rates for 1979-1980 movers by age, California 1980. 
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Source: 1980 IPUMS. Notes: Each dot represents the average effective tax rates faced by each age group. See Figure 4 for details. 
 
 40
Figure 13. Average effective property tax rates for 1989-1990 movers by age, Texas 1990. 
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Source: 1990 IPUMS. Notes: Each dot represents the average effective tax rates faced by each age group. See Figure 4 for details. 
 
Figure 14. Probability of moving by ability to transfer the tax benefit for homeowners by age, 
California 1990. 
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Source: 1990 IPUMS. Notes: The group of homeowners allowed to transfer the tax benefit moved in 1989-1990 within the same 
county, or to a county without Proposition 90.  The remaining homeowners that moved in 1989-1990 were not allowed to 
transfer the tax benefit.  See Figure 4 for details. 
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Figure 15. Average property taxes for 1989-1990 movers allowed to transfer the tax benefit by 
age, California 1990. 
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Source: 1990 IPUMS.  Notes: Each dot represents the average property taxes faced by each age group. See Figure 4 for details. 
 
Figure 16. Predicted probabilities of moving by age, San Francisco Bay Area 1990 
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Source: 1990 IPUMS. Notes: The predicted probabilities are normalized by the observed mobility rates of 54-year 
old homeowners, in order to make the predictions comparable to the results showed in Figure 4.  The control 
function model includes all choice variables and heterogeneity. Results from this figure will be shown for the 
restricted Census data only after disclosure analysis made by the Census Bureau. 
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Table 6. Multinomial logit sample, San Francisco Bay Area 1990.
30 to 70-year old
homeowners
(1) (2)
house value 306984 301609
number of rooms 6.31 5.92
1 if detached 0.85 0.72
1 if built in 1985-89 0.08 0.27
1 if built in 1980-84 0.07 0.09
1 if built in 1970-79 0.20 0.20
block group average income 64546 63941
block group % white 0.73 0.72
elevation 248.00 250.00
1st grade test scores 545.00 541.00
population density 0.28 0.27
air quality index 23.29 23.47
sample size 98407 8347
Source: US Census Bureau - 1990 California Decennial Census Long Form data and 1990 IPUMS. Notes: Average income,
percentage white, and density are constructed at the block group level. Elevation is measured at the block level (source: 
EPA: BASINS). Test scores are assigned from the closest school within the school district (source: California Department 
of Education, 1991-1993). Air quality is predicted for each census block using information from monitor stations (source:
Rand California, 1990) and industrial plants (source: EPA – AIRS –Aerometric Information Retrieval System, 1990).
 
choice set
T
ab
le
 7
. M
ul
tin
om
ia
l l
og
it 
es
tim
at
es
, 3
0 
to
 7
0-
ye
ar
 o
ld
 h
om
eo
w
ne
rs
, S
an
 F
ra
nc
is
co
 B
ay
 A
re
a,
 19
90
.
sim
pl
e
ot
he
r h
ou
se
ot
he
r n
eig
h.
all
m
od
el 
(5
) w
ith
m
od
el 
(6
) w
ith
lo
gi
t
va
ria
bl
es
va
ria
bl
es
va
ria
bl
es
he
te
ro
ge
ne
ity
in
te
ra
ct
io
ns
lo
gi
t
co
nt
ro
l f
un
ct
io
n
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
(7
)
(8
)
(9
)
us
er
 c
os
t
-0
.4
90
3
-0
.4
63
5
-0
.5
89
4
-0
.5
17
4
-4
.7
32
0
-4
.1
93
0
-3
.5
34
5
-0
.3
34
8
-1
3.
15
02
(0
.0
05
2)
(0
.0
05
4)
(0
.0
05
5)
(0
.0
05
7)
(0
.0
10
9)
(0
.0
71
7)
(0
.0
72
8)
(0
.0
08
6)
(0
.0
65
3)
nu
m
be
r o
f r
oo
m
s
0.
29
96
0.
37
43
0.
32
72
0.
38
56
1.
54
97
0.
56
71
0.
40
14
-0
.3
67
2
-0
.8
78
2
(0
.0
04
5)
(0
.0
04
6)
(0
.0
04
6)
(0
.0
04
6)
(0
.0
08
2)
(0
.0
46
1)
(0
.0
48
0)
(0
.0
07
7)
(0
.0
09
3)
1 
if 
de
ta
ch
ed
 h
ou
se
0.
38
36
0.
19
75
0.
42
84
0.
21
81
0.
90
54
1.
37
90
1.
27
31
-0
.2
50
6
-0
.6
87
7
(0
.0
04
4)
(0
.0
04
6)
(0
.0
04
5)
(0
.0
04
8)
(0
.0
07
6)
(0
.0
42
5)
(0
.0
44
6)
(0
.0
10
1)
(0
.0
10
6)
av
er
ag
e 
ne
ig
hb
or
ho
od
 in
co
m
e
0.
15
18
0.
20
38
0.
16
80
0.
18
83
1.
87
18
1.
03
92
0.
18
52
0.
01
50
-1
.0
53
1
(0
.0
04
4)
(0
.0
04
5)
(0
.0
04
9)
(0
.0
05
0)
(0
.0
09
1)
(0
.0
57
2)
(0
.0
55
9)
(0
.0
07
4)
(0
.0
10
5)
co
nt
ro
l f
un
ct
io
n
3.
86
44
2.
73
67
3.
28
06
12
.7
42
6
(0
.0
06
9)
(0
.0
48
2)
(0
.0
53
7)
(0
.0
62
1)
ho
us
e 
co
nt
ro
ls
N
Y
N
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
ne
ig
hb
or
ho
od
 c
on
tro
ls
N
N
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
nu
m
be
r o
f h
ou
se
ho
ld
s
98
40
7
98
40
7
98
40
7
98
40
7
98
40
7
98
40
7
98
40
7
98
40
7
98
40
7
So
ur
ce
: U
S 
Ce
ns
us
 B
ur
ea
u 
- 1
99
0 
Ca
lif
or
ni
a 
D
ec
en
ni
al 
Ce
ns
us
 L
on
g 
Fo
rm
 d
at
a. 
N
ot
es
: T
ab
le 
sh
ow
s m
ul
tin
om
ial
 lo
gi
t e
st
im
at
es
 (a
nd
 st
an
da
rd
 e
rr
or
s )
 o
f t
he
 h
ou
se
ho
ld
 lo
ca
tio
n 
de
cis
io
n 
m
od
el.
 O
th
er
 h
ou
se
 v
ar
iab
les
 in
clu
de
: b
ui
lt 
in
 1
98
5-
19
89
, b
ui
lt 
in
 1
98
0-
19
84
, a
nd
 b
ui
lt 
in
 1
97
0-
19
79
.
O
th
er
 n
eig
hb
or
ho
od
 c
on
tro
ls 
in
clu
de
: b
lo
ck
 g
ro
up
 p
er
ce
nt
ag
e 
w
hi
te
, d
en
sit
y, 
ele
va
tio
n,
 a
ir 
qu
ali
ty
, a
nd
 fi
rs
t g
ra
de
 te
st
 sc
or
es
. S
ta
nd
ar
d 
er
ro
rs
 fo
r t
he
 c
on
tro
l f
un
ct
io
n 
ap
pr
oa
ch
 st
ill
 n
ee
d 
to
 b
e 
co
rr
ec
te
d 
by
 b
oo
ts
tra
pp
in
g 
th
e 
fir
st
 st
ag
e 
re
gr
es
sio
ns
 w
ith
 th
e 
fo
llo
w
in
g 
pr
oc
ed
ur
e:
 a
) r
ep
ea
te
dl
y 
es
tim
at
e 
th
e 
fir
st
 st
ag
es
 w
ith
 b
oo
ts
tra
pp
ed
 u
se
r c
os
t s
am
pl
es
, b
) r
e-
es
tim
at
e 
th
e 
m
ul
tin
om
ial
 lo
gi
t w
ith
 th
e 
ne
w
 re
sid
ua
ls,
 c
) c
alc
ul
at
e 
th
e 
sa
m
pl
e 
va
ria
nc
e 
of
 th
e 
es
tim
at
ed
 c
oe
ffc
ien
ts
 a
nd
 a
dd
 it
 to
 th
e 
st
an
da
rd
 e
rr
or
s o
bt
ain
ed
 fr
om
 th
e 
tra
di
tio
na
l f
or
m
ul
as
 (s
ho
w
n 
in
 th
e 
Ta
bl
e)
.
w
ea
lth
 e
ffe
ct
s
co
nt
ro
l f
un
ct
io
n
T
ab
le
 8
. I
m
pl
ie
d 
m
ar
gi
na
l w
ill
in
gn
es
s t
o 
pa
y 
fo
r h
ou
si
ng
 c
ha
ra
ct
er
is
tic
s, 
30
 to
 7
0-
ye
ar
 o
ld
 h
om
eo
w
ne
rs
, S
an
 F
ra
nc
is
co
 B
ay
 A
re
a,
 19
90
.
sim
pl
e
ot
he
r h
ou
se
ot
he
r n
eig
h.
all
m
od
el 
(5
) w
ith
m
od
el 
(6
) w
ith
lo
gi
t
va
ria
bl
es
va
ria
bl
es
va
ria
bl
es
he
te
ro
ge
ne
ity
in
te
ra
ct
io
ns
lo
gi
t
co
nt
ro
l f
un
ct
io
n
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
(7
)
(8
)
(9
)
1 
ex
tra
 ro
om
3,
27
5
4,
32
7
2,
97
5
3,
99
4
1,
75
4
1,
85
4
1,
85
0
10
07
63
61
35
(6
5)
(7
5)
(5
1)
(7
9)
(2
2)
(5
1)
(7
5)
(3
31
1)
(7
2)
de
ta
ch
ed
 h
ou
se
17
,2
10
9,
32
5
15
,9
03
9,
22
4
4,
18
6
4,
08
8
4,
53
2
28
27
12
19
74
9
(2
90
)
(2
48
)
(2
27
)
(2
68
)
(9
6)
(1
44
)
(1
84
)
(1
34
14
)
(3
19
)
$1
0,
00
0 
ch
an
ge
 in
 n
eig
hb
or
ho
od
 in
co
m
e
1,
08
1
1,
53
5
99
5
1,
23
6
1,
38
1
1,
32
2
1,
01
0
-2
66
4
47
58
(3
6)
(3
9)
(3
1)
(4
1)
(2
1)
(3
8)
(7
6)
(1
31
4)
(5
3)
ho
us
e 
co
nt
ro
ls
N
Y
N
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
ne
ig
hb
or
ho
od
 c
on
tro
ls
N
N
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
av
er
ag
e 
us
er
 c
os
t
20
03
5
20
03
5
20
03
5
20
03
5
20
03
5
20
03
5
20
03
5
55
19
7
55
19
7
nu
m
be
r o
f h
ou
se
ho
ld
s
98
40
7
98
40
7
98
40
7
98
40
7
98
40
7
98
40
7
98
40
7
98
40
7
98
40
7
So
ur
ce
: U
S 
Ce
ns
us
 B
ur
ea
u 
- 1
99
0 
Ca
lif
or
ni
a 
D
ec
en
ni
al 
Ce
ns
us
 L
on
g 
Fo
rm
 d
at
a. 
N
ot
es
: T
ab
le 
sh
ow
s M
W
TP
 e
st
im
at
es
 (a
nd
 st
an
da
rd
 e
rr
or
s )
 d
er
iv
ed
 fr
om
 T
ab
le 
7.
 O
th
er
 h
ou
se
 v
ar
iab
les
 in
clu
de
: b
ui
lt 
in
 1
98
5-
19
89
, b
ui
lt 
in
 1
98
0-
19
84
, a
nd
 b
ui
lt 
in
 1
97
0-
19
79
.
O
th
er
 n
eig
hb
or
ho
od
 c
on
tro
ls 
in
clu
de
: b
lo
ck
 g
ro
up
 p
er
ce
nt
ag
e 
w
hi
te
, d
en
sit
y, 
ele
va
tio
n,
 a
ir 
qu
ali
ty
, a
nd
 fi
rs
t g
ra
de
 te
st
 sc
or
es
. S
ta
nd
ar
d 
er
ro
rs
 w
er
e 
ca
lcu
lat
ed
 u
sin
g 
th
e 
de
lta
 m
et
ho
d.
w
ea
lth
 e
ffe
ct
s
co
nt
ro
l f
un
ct
io
n
T
ab
le
 9
. H
ed
on
ic
 p
ric
e 
re
gr
es
si
on
s, 
30
 to
 7
0-
ye
ar
 o
ld
 h
om
eo
w
ne
rs
, S
an
 F
ra
nc
is
co
 B
ay
 A
re
a,
 19
90
.
w
ea
lth
 e
ffe
ct
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
1 
ex
tra
 ro
om
1,
69
3
1,
69
8
1,
57
0
1,
54
9
5,
68
4
(1
4)
(1
4)
(1
3)
(1
3)
(1
49
)
de
ta
ch
ed
 h
ou
se
1,
14
9
1,
32
8
1,
76
2
2,
43
4
-3
,2
00
(5
9)
(6
2)
(5
7)
(6
0)
(6
87
)
$1
0,
00
0 
ch
an
ge
 in
 n
eig
hb
or
ho
od
 in
co
m
e
1,
63
5
1,
65
2
1,
34
6
1,
32
7
8,
11
4
(8
)
(8
)
(9
)
(9
)
(9
9)
ho
us
e 
co
nt
ro
ls
N
Y
N
Y
Y
ne
ig
hb
or
ho
od
 c
on
tro
ls
N
N
Y
Y
Y
R-
sq
ua
re
d
0.
51
0.
52
0.
56
0.
57
0.
13
av
er
ag
e 
us
er
 c
os
t
20
03
5
20
03
5
20
03
5
20
03
5
55
19
7
nu
m
be
r o
f h
ou
se
ho
ld
s
98
40
7
98
40
7
98
40
7
98
40
7
98
40
7
So
ur
ce
: U
S 
Ce
ns
us
 B
ur
ea
u 
- 1
99
0 
Ca
lif
or
ni
a 
D
ec
en
ni
al 
Ce
ns
us
 L
on
g 
Fo
rm
 d
at
a. 
N
ot
es
: T
ab
le 
sh
ow
s l
in
ea
r r
eg
re
ss
io
n 
es
tim
at
es
 o
f t
he
 u
se
r c
os
t o
f t
he
 h
ou
se
 o
n 
ho
us
in
g 
an
d 
ne
ig
hb
or
ho
od
 
ch
ar
ac
te
ris
tic
s. 
O
th
er
 h
ou
se
 v
ar
iab
les
 in
clu
de
: b
ui
lt 
in
 1
98
5-
19
89
, b
ui
lt 
in
 1
98
0-
19
84
, a
nd
 b
ui
lt 
in
 1
97
0-
19
79
. O
th
er
 n
eig
hb
or
ho
od
 c
on
tro
ls 
in
clu
de
: b
lo
ck
 g
ro
up
 p
er
ce
nt
ag
e 
w
hi
te
, d
en
sit
y, 
ele
va
tio
n,
 a
ir 
qu
ali
ty
, a
nd
 fi
rs
t g
ra
de
 te
st
 sc
or
es
. 
de
pe
nd
en
t v
ar
iab
le:
 u
se
r c
os
t
T
ab
le
 10
. I
de
nt
ifi
ca
tio
n 
te
st
s -
 m
ul
tin
om
ia
l l
og
it 
es
tim
at
es
.
sim
pl
e
co
nt
ro
l
sim
pl
e
co
nt
ro
l
ad
ju
st
ed
sim
pl
e
co
nt
ro
l
lo
gi
t
fu
nc
tio
n
lo
gi
t
fu
nc
tio
n
in
st
ru
m
en
t
lo
gi
t
fu
nc
tio
n
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
(7
)
(8
)
(9
)
(1
0)
us
er
 c
os
t
-0
.1
46
4
-0
.1
33
3
-0
.1
08
8
-0
.4
27
8
-2
.1
82
8
0.
97
66
-2
.6
19
0
-0
.5
26
5
-7
.9
57
0
0.
06
03
(0
.0
16
4)
(0
.0
17
4)
(0
.0
17
5)
(0
.0
07
5)
(0
.0
13
2)
(1
88
.4
24
8)
(0
.0
20
9)
(0
.0
12
9)
(0
.0
37
5)
(2
94
.9
00
6)
nu
m
be
r o
f r
oo
m
s
0.
07
17
6
0.
06
44
0.
04
96
6
0.
32
71
0.
75
51
-0
.0
77
0
0.
87
96
0.
40
02
2.
36
13
0.
24
35
(0
.0
13
9)
(0
.0
14
0)
(0
.0
14
0)
(0
.0
06
0)
(0
.0
11
1)
(5
3.
99
03
)
(0
.0
16
5)
(0
.0
10
4)
(0
.0
19
4)
(7
9.
15
35
)
1 
if 
de
ta
ch
ed
 h
ou
se
0.
06
53
8
0.
06
50
4
0.
06
43
0.
21
30
0.
43
67
-0
.0
32
0
0.
46
04
0.
67
06
2.
18
88
0.
55
49
(0
.0
11
3)
(0
.0
11
4)
(0
.0
11
4)
(0
.0
06
2)
(0
.0
10
2)
(3
3.
39
52
)
(0
.0
15
5)
(0
.0
12
2)
(0
.0
20
5)
(5
7.
80
87
)
av
er
ag
e 
ne
ig
hb
or
ho
od
 in
co
m
e
-0
.0
67
2
-0
.0
70
57
-0
.0
77
2
0.
12
71
0.
86
04
-0
.4
38
5
1.
19
75
0.
18
24
3.
44
49
-0
.0
64
5
(0
.0
11
3)
(0
.0
11
3)
(0
.0
11
3)
(0
.0
06
9)
(0
.0
11
8)
(7
5.
24
74
)
(0
.0
14
7)
(0
.0
10
6)
(0
.0
24
9)
(1
27
.5
17
7)
co
nt
ro
l f
un
ct
io
n
-0
.0
56
02
-0
.1
31
2
2.
09
31
-0
.6
67
3
2.
86
42
6.
52
00
(0
.0
03
4)
(0
.0
04
0)
(0
.0
04
6)
(1
15
.0
81
8)
(0
.0
07
1)
(0
.0
31
5)
ho
us
e 
co
nt
ro
ls
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
ne
ig
hb
or
ho
od
 c
on
tro
ls
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
nu
m
be
r o
f h
ou
se
ho
ld
s
11
08
3
11
08
3
11
08
3
55
67
6
55
67
6
55
67
6
55
67
6
20
87
6
20
87
6
20
87
6
So
ur
ce
: U
S 
Ce
ns
us
 B
ur
ea
u 
- 1
99
0 
Ca
lif
or
ni
a 
D
ec
en
ni
al 
Ce
ns
us
 L
on
g 
Fo
rm
 d
at
a 
an
d 
19
90
 IP
U
M
S.
 N
ot
es
: T
ab
le 
sh
ow
s m
ul
tin
om
ial
 lo
gi
t e
st
im
at
es
 (a
nd
 st
an
da
rd
 e
rr
or
s )
 o
f t
he
 h
ou
se
ho
ld
 lo
ca
tio
n 
de
cis
io
n 
m
od
el.
 T
he
 D
all
as
-T
X
 m
od
el 
us
es
 th
e 
19
90
 IP
U
M
S 
da
ta
 b
ec
au
se
 o
f d
ela
ys
 in
 g
et
tin
g 
ac
ce
ss
 
to
 th
e 
re
st
ric
te
d 
Ce
ns
us
 d
at
a 
fo
r T
ex
as
. O
th
er
 h
ou
se
 v
ar
iab
les
 in
clu
de
: b
ui
lt 
in
 1
98
5-
19
89
, b
ui
lt 
in
 1
98
0-
19
84
, a
nd
 b
ui
lt 
in
 1
97
0-
19
79
. O
th
er
 n
eig
hb
or
ho
od
 c
on
tro
ls 
in
clu
de
: b
lo
ck
 g
ro
up
 p
er
ce
nt
ag
e 
w
hi
te
, d
en
sit
y, 
ele
va
tio
n,
 a
ir 
qu
ali
ty
, a
nd
 fi
rs
t g
ra
de
 te
st
 sc
or
es
. S
ta
nd
ar
d 
er
ro
rs
 fo
r t
he
 c
on
tro
l
fu
nc
tio
n 
ap
pr
oa
ch
 st
ill
 n
ee
d 
to
 b
e 
co
rr
ec
te
d 
by
 b
oo
ts
tra
pp
in
g 
th
e 
fir
st
 st
ag
e 
re
gr
es
sio
ns
 w
ith
 th
e 
fo
llo
w
in
g 
pr
oc
ed
ur
e: 
a)
 re
pe
at
ed
ly 
es
tim
at
e 
th
e 
fir
st
 st
ag
es
 w
ith
 b
oo
ts
tra
pp
ed
 u
se
r c
os
t s
am
pl
es
, b
) r
e-
es
tim
at
e 
th
e 
m
ul
tin
om
ial
 lo
gi
t w
ith
 th
e 
ne
w
 re
sid
ua
ls,
 c
) c
alc
ul
at
e 
th
e 
sa
m
pl
e 
va
ria
nc
e 
of
 th
e
es
tim
at
ed
 c
oe
ffc
ien
ts
 a
nd
 a
dd
 it
 to
 th
e 
st
an
da
rd
 e
rr
or
s o
bt
ain
ed
 fr
om
 th
e 
tra
di
tio
na
l f
or
m
ul
as
 (s
ho
w
n 
in
 th
e 
Ta
bl
e)
.
D
all
as
, 3
0-
70
 y
ea
r o
ld
s
Sa
n 
Fr
an
cis
co
, 3
0-
49
 y
ea
r o
ld
s
Sa
n 
Fr
an
cis
co
, 6
0-
70
 y
ea
r o
ld
s
sim
ul
at
io
n
sim
ul
at
io
n
sim
ul
at
io
n
T
ab
le
 11
. I
de
nt
ifi
ca
tio
n 
te
st
s -
 M
W
T
P 
es
tim
at
es
.
sim
pl
e
co
nt
ro
l
sim
pl
e
co
nt
ro
l
ad
ju
st
ed
sim
pl
e
co
nt
ro
l
lo
gi
t
fu
nc
tio
n
lo
gi
t
fu
nc
tio
n
in
st
ru
m
en
t
lo
gi
t
fu
nc
tio
n
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
(7
)
(8
)
(9
)
(1
0)
1 
ex
tra
 ro
om
2,
12
6
2,
09
4
1,
98
0
3,
99
3
1,
80
6
30
2
1,
75
4
4,
77
7
1,
86
5
-2
2,
24
8
(4
77
)
(5
32
)
(6
44
)
(1
03
)
(2
9)
(2
19
64
8)
(3
6)
(1
72
)
(1
8)
(1
09
12
93
57
)
de
ta
ch
ed
 h
ou
se
11
,6
99
12
,7
79
15
,4
82
10
,9
59
4,
40
3
63
4
3,
86
8
25
,7
27
5,
55
6
-1
62
,9
52
(2
42
0)
(2
79
5)
(3
71
5)
(3
78
)
(1
07
)
(6
73
46
4)
(1
34
)
(7
88
)
(5
8)
(7
97
72
42
62
)
$1
0,
00
0 
ch
an
ge
 in
 n
eig
hb
or
ho
od
 in
co
m
e
-3
,2
53
-3
,7
51
-5
,0
31
1,
04
1
1,
38
1
1,
38
5
1,
60
2
1,
31
1
1,
63
9
3,
55
1
(6
54
)
(7
72
)
(1
09
1)
(6
0)
(2
1)
(3
57
61
3)
(2
4)
(8
3)
(1
4)
(1
87
42
87
6)
ho
us
e 
co
nt
ro
ls
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
ne
ig
hb
or
ho
od
 c
on
tro
ls
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
av
er
ag
e 
us
er
 c
os
t
81
42
81
42
81
42
20
46
3
20
46
3
20
46
3
20
46
3
18
51
0
18
51
0
18
51
0
nu
m
be
r o
f h
ou
se
ho
ld
s
11
08
3
11
08
3
11
08
3
55
67
6
55
67
6
55
67
6
55
67
6
20
87
6
20
87
6
20
87
6
So
ur
ce
: U
S 
Ce
ns
us
 B
ur
ea
u 
- 1
99
0 
Ca
lif
or
ni
a 
D
ec
en
ni
al 
Ce
ns
us
 L
on
g 
Fo
rm
 d
at
a 
an
d 
19
90
 IP
U
M
S.
 N
ot
es
: T
ab
le 
sh
ow
s M
W
TP
 e
st
im
at
es
 (a
nd
 st
an
da
rd
 e
rr
or
s )
 d
er
iv
ed
 fr
om
 T
ab
le 
7.
 O
th
er
 h
ou
se
 v
ar
iab
les
 in
clu
de
: b
ui
lt 
in
 1
98
5-
19
89
, b
ui
lt 
in
 1
98
0-
19
84
, a
nd
 b
ui
lt 
in
 1
97
0-
19
79
.
O
th
er
 n
eig
hb
or
ho
od
 c
on
tro
ls 
in
clu
de
: b
lo
ck
 g
ro
up
 p
er
ce
nt
ag
e 
w
hi
te
, d
en
sit
y, 
ele
va
tio
n,
 a
ir 
qu
ali
ty
, a
nd
 fi
rs
t g
ra
de
 te
st
 sc
or
es
. S
ta
nd
ar
d 
er
ro
rs
 w
er
e 
ca
lcu
lat
ed
 u
sin
g 
th
e 
de
lta
 m
et
ho
d.
D
all
as
, 3
0-
70
 y
ea
r o
ld
s
Sa
n 
Fr
an
cis
co
, 6
0-
70
 y
ea
r o
ld
s
Sa
n 
Fr
an
cis
co
, 3
0-
49
 y
ea
r o
ld
s
sim
ul
at
io
n
sim
ul
at
io
n
sim
ul
at
io
n
Ap
pe
nd
ix
 T
ab
le
 1.
 F
irs
t s
ta
ge
 e
st
im
at
es
w
ea
lth
co
nt
ro
l
co
nt
ro
l
ad
ju
st
ed
co
nt
ro
l
ef
fe
ct
s
fu
nc
tio
n
fu
nc
tio
n
in
st
ru
m
en
t
fu
nc
tio
n
de
pe
nd
en
t v
ar
iab
le:
 u
se
r c
os
t
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
(7
)
(8
)
(9
)
(1
0)
pr
op
er
ty
 ta
xe
s
4.
6
4.
4
-0
.0
00
3
5.
2
5.
1
5.
7
1.
1
6.
1
3.
9
1.
1
(0
.0
03
)
(0
.0
03
)
(0
.0
00
00
3)
(0
.0
03
)
(0
.0
03
)
(0
.0
04
)
(0
.0
05
)
(0
.0
03
)
(0
.0
07
)
(0
.0
12
)
nu
m
be
r o
f r
oo
m
s
66
9
66
5
-0
.0
22
58
80
37
9
1,
31
7
28
4
86
2
1,
47
8
(2
.4
)
(2
.4
)
(0
.0
03
)
(2
.1
)
(2
.4
)
(2
.3
)
(4
.4
)
(2
.0
)
(6
.9
)
(9
.0
)
1 
if 
de
ta
ch
ed
 h
ou
se
1,
57
2
1,
73
3
-0
.1
46
-4
8
-2
5
88
2
3,
43
3
64
4
2,
28
3
3,
46
8
(8
.8
)
(9
.5
)
(0
.0
11
)
(1
0)
(1
1)
(9
.5
)
(1
8)
(8
.0
)
(2
3)
(3
1)
av
er
ag
e 
in
co
m
e 
of
 n
eig
hb
or
ho
od
58
5
52
2
-0
.0
32
49
67
24
8
12
32
16
3
79
0
14
34
(1
.6
)
(1
.8
)
(0
.0
02
)
(2
.9
)
(3
.2
)
(1
.8
)
(3
.3
)
(1
.5
)
(4
.5
)
(5
.7
)
ot
he
r h
ou
se
 c
on
tro
ls
N
Y
Y
Y
Y
N
Y
Y
N
Y
ot
he
r n
eig
hb
or
ho
od
 c
on
tro
ls
N
Y
Y
Y
Y
N
Y
Y
N
Y
R-
sq
ua
re
d
0.
86
0.
87
0.
04
0.
99
0.
98
0.
93
0.
63
0.
95
0.
82
0.
59
Sa
m
pl
e 
siz
e
10
82
47
7
10
82
47
7
59
04
42
12
19
13
12
19
13
61
24
36
61
24
36
61
24
36
22
96
35
22
96
35
So
ur
ce
: U
S 
Ce
ns
us
 B
ur
ea
u 
- 1
99
0 
Ca
lif
or
ni
a 
D
ec
en
ni
al 
Ce
ns
us
 L
on
g 
Fo
rm
 d
at
a. 
N
ot
es
: T
ab
le 
sh
ow
s m
ul
tip
le 
re
gr
es
sio
n 
es
tim
at
es
 o
f t
he
 u
se
r c
os
t o
f t
he
 h
ou
se
 o
n 
th
e 
in
st
ru
m
en
ta
l v
ar
iab
le 
an
d 
ot
he
r h
ou
sin
g 
an
d 
ne
ig
hb
or
ho
od
 c
ha
ra
ct
er
ist
ics
. O
th
er
 h
ou
se
 v
ar
iab
les
 in
clu
de
: 
bu
ilt
 in
 1
98
5-
19
89
, b
ui
lt 
in
 1
98
0-
19
84
, a
nd
 b
ui
lt 
in
 1
97
0-
19
79
. O
th
er
 n
eig
hb
or
ho
od
 c
on
tro
ls 
in
clu
de
: b
lo
ck
 g
ro
up
 p
er
ce
nt
ag
e 
w
hi
te
, d
en
sit
y, 
ele
va
tio
n,
 a
ir 
qu
ali
ty
, a
nd
 fi
rs
t g
ra
de
 te
st
 sc
or
es
.
sim
ul
at
io
n
Sa
n 
Fr
an
cis
co
, 6
0 
to
 7
0-
ye
ar
 o
ld
s
sim
ul
at
io
n
co
nt
ro
l f
un
ct
io
n
Sa
n 
Fr
an
cis
co
, 3
0-
70
 y
ea
r o
ld
s
D
all
as
, 3
0 
to
 7
0-
ye
ar
 o
ld
s
Sa
n 
Fr
an
cis
co
, 3
0 
to
 4
9-
ye
ar
 o
ld
s
sim
ul
at
io
n
